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CONSIDERATION IN MORTGAGES
NECESSITY FOP A CONSDERATION
The whole question as to whether a consideration is neces-
sary to support a valid mortgage is one of great importance. At
common law, the mortgage was regarded as passing the whole
legal title to the estate pledged to the mortgagee, who became
the owner of it, although his title was liable to be defeated on a
condition subsequent. If the debtor punctually performed his
part of the contract at the appointed time, the estate of the
mortgagee, by the performance of the condition, determined
and ceased, but as the legal title was in him, the estate was not
revested in the mortgagor by the mere act of payment or other
performance, but it was necessary that the mortgagee should
reconvey to him by deed.
Equity courts looked with disfavor on the strict common-
law doctrine of absolute forfeiture of the estate on non-payment
of the mortgage debt. Accordingly, they established the rule
that the debtor should still have a right to redeem after the
breach of the condition at law. Thus, until foreclosure, the
mortgagor continues to be the real owner of the fee. His equity
of redemption is tantamount to the fee at law. In some few
American states the common-law doctrine still prevails, although
extensively modified by the equitable principles set forth.
Now, a mortgage is considered quite generally as merely
security for a primary obligation. There is no reason for the
introduction of the doctrine of consideration as it may affect
the validity of a mortgage, unless a mortgage is to be deemed
an executory contract and a lien only, in all its consequences.'
For the most part, the authorities are uniform in holding
that a consideration is necessary in order that a mortgage
should be enforced.2 A few cases hold, and even then the con-
mKup v. Kusp, 21 L.. R. A. 550, note.
2Hall v. Davis (1884) 73 Ga. 101; Scott v. Magloughlin (1890) 133
IlL 33, 24 N. E. 1030.
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clusion is questionable, that a mortgage intended as an enforce-
able primary obligation, given without consideration, is valid,
except as against creditors. 3 These cases are quite unsatisfac-
tory for the proposition indicated and by far the majority hold
that a debt is an essential requisite of a mortgage.4
The consideration for a mortgage, in the nature of a debt
can be either preexisting or created at the time, or even may
arise in the future.5 Furthermore, the consideration may pass
at the execution of the mortgage or at a subsequent time., One
recognized authority says regarding this matter :7
"It is not necessary that any consideration should pass at the time
of the execution of the mortgage. That may be either a prior or a
subsequent matter. Mortgages are frequently given to secure existing
debts, in which case the consideration generally held valid, is a past
consideration."
Even the cases that hold that a valid mortgage may be
executed without a consideration are qualified to the extent that
such a mortgage is not valid if it may tend to defraud other
people. Thus in Brigham v. Brown :s
"A man may give a voluntary mortgage if he chooses, and it will
be good except as to those who might be defrauded by it. But the fact
that a mortgage is given without consideration may have an important
bearing on any disputed question concerning its delivery or recording."
And in another case :9
"If a mortgage Is given without any consideration the mortgagor
can maintain a bill in equity to have the mortgage and note delivered
up and cancelled."
Generally speaking then, while there must be some con-
sideration for a chattel mortgage, 10 it is not essential that a debt
exist independently of the mortgage. The parties may confine
3 Brooks v. Da~rymple, 12 Allen (Mass.) 102; Brighman v. Brown,
44 Mich. 59; and Campbell v. Tompkins, 32 N. J. Eq. 170.
'Arizona Copper Est. v. Watts, 237 Fed. 585; McNeill v. McNeill,
204 Il1. A. 287; Donovan v. Boech, 217 Mo. 70, 116 S. W. 263; Cawley v.
Kelley, 60 Wise. 315, 19 N. W. 65. See also Finnerty v. John S. Blake,
etc., Realty Co., 276 Mo. 332, 207 S. W. 772; Schaeppi v. GladTe, 195 Ill.
62, 62 N. E. 874; Parft v. Sherman, 208 Mich. 297, 176 N. W. 583.
5Jones on Mortgages, 6th Ed., section 265.
4Evans v. Pence, 78 Ind. 439; Duncan v. Miller, 64 Iowa 223, 226.TJones, Chattel Mortgages, 6th Ed., section 611.
"Brigham v. Brown, 44 Mich. 59.
"fSaunders v. Dunn, 175 Mass. 164, 55 N. E. 893.
Look v. Comstocke, 15 Wend. 244.
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the remedy of the mortgagee to the mortgage alone."1 In fact,
the debt may be owed to one person and the mortgage given by
another.'
2
As to what the courts consider a valid obligation is a
somewhat complicated matter. Generally, anything which
is consideration for a contract constitutes a valuable con-
sideration for a chattel mortgage.13 Clearly, a mortgage under
seal obviates the necessity of consideration and is invariably
held valid.14
II
TYPES o CONSIDERATION HELD SUFICIENT
First of all, the courts are uniform in holding that an
antecedent or preexisting debt is a valid consideration for a
mortgage.3 5 In this respect there is no appreciable variance
among the authorities. One might well question why the con-
sideration of a mortgage is not of the same formality as that for.
a deed. As indicated above it has the same significance in the
event the mortgagor does not act during the period of re-
demption.
Unless there has been additional evidence offered which
clearly proves a lack of consideration, a recital of "$10.00 in
hand paid" as the consideration of a mortgage is sufficient to
sustain it on demurrer for want of consideration, in the absence
of all other evidence.' 6 If the consideration is valuable it need
not be adequate. A recital in the mortgage of a consideration
of one dollar, receipt of which is acknowledged by the mort-
gagor, prima facie shows a valuable and real consideration and
its actual payment, and in the absence of opposing proof, such
a consideration is sufficient to support the mortgage.' 7 In any
37natthews v. Sheehan, 69 N. Y. 585; Blake v. Corbett, 120 N. T.
327.
1Blake v. Corbett, 120 N. Y. 327.
"Cobb v. Malone, 87 Ala. 514, 6 So. 299.
2 Callekns v. Long, 22 Barb. 97; Best v. Thiel, 79 N. Y. 15.
21Ustna v. Wilder, 58 'Ga. 178; Hewi t v. Powers, 84 Ind. 295; Lee
State Bank v. McRlheney, 227 Mich. 322, 198 N. W. 928.
Grtmbafl v. Mastin, 77 Ala. 553.
"TLawrence v. McCalmont, 2 How. 426; Boling v. M 'nchus, 65 Ala.
558; Grimbal v. Mastin, 77 Ala. 553.
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case, a nominal consideration named is sufficient, and in fact, it
is not essential that any consideration be expressed.18
The consideration to support a mortgage is valid even when
it moves from the mortgagee to a third party.19. This is entirely
consistent with the theory of consideration in the field of con-
tracts. While the mortage must be founded on a valuable con-
sideration generally, tile consideration need not be one moving
directly from the mortgagee to the mortgagor; but any benefit
to the mortgagor or a stranger, or damage or loss to the mort-
gagee rendered or sustained at the request of the mortgagor is
sufficient.
20
Again, consistent with the theory of a detriment to the
promisee in a contract, the release of what the mortgagee
believed to be a good cause of action, and which was at least
prima facie so, is a suffieient consideration for a note and mort-
gage.2 1 Of a similar character, the relinquishment of his right
to bid at a judicial sale by a creditor who has no other means of
obtaining payment of his debt is a sufficient consideration to
support a mortgage for the amount of the claim given him by
the one who at the sale secures the legal title to the land sold.22
Another field in which the question of consideration has
been much mooted is where there is some blood relationship
between the parties. In this direction there is a decided con-
flict in the authorities. A consideration need only be sufficient
to uphold the mortgage as a conveyance of an estate to make it
valid between the parties to it, others having no greater right.
The relation of blood between the father and daughter would
be sufficient consideration.2 3  Logically, no more consideration
should be necessary to uphold a conveyance upon condition than
an absolute conveyance. The estate conveyed is the same. This
estate could be defeated by the payment of the sum of money
mentioned in the mortgage deed.
Where there is a blood relationship between the parties,
some cases hold that there is no necessity of a money consid-
Robinson v. Wfllams, 22 N. Y. 380.
"Rockafellow v. Peay, 40 Ark. 69.
Jones, Chattel Mortgages, 6th Ed., see. 610.
2'Zent V. Lewis, 90 Wash. 651, 156 Pac. 848.
"Hopkins v. Ensign, 122 N. Y. 144, 25 N. E. 306.
Is2 B1. Comm. 296; 4 Kent. Comm. 464; 3 Wash. Real Property,
bk. 3, ch. 5, see. 3.
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eration. The relationship between a father and child is suf-
ficient.24 Thus, a mortgage by a daughter to her father as
security for the debts of her deceased husband, though they
could not be enforced against her, will be upheld. 25 In one
case, however, the relation of affection existing between two
brothers at the time when the instrument in question was
executed was adverted to as one of the circumstances which
repelled every inference of a mortgage, and confirmed the pre-
sumption attached to the deeds themselves.
20
In some instances, even the relationships arising out of
marriage are regarded as having a distinct tendency to show
that a transaction was a mortgage. In one case, 27 the confi-
dential relation of the parties, (brothers-in-law) was taken to
show an arrangement for a mortgage. In still other cases of
this character, however, the relation is not counted upon, to
show a mortgage was intended.28 Still another line of cases hold
that although love and affection is sufficient consideration for a
deed, it is not so for an executory contract.29
The extent to which the courts will sometimes go in finding
a consideration on which they can support a mortgage trans-
action is illustrated in a New York case. Herein the first
mortgage contained a provision that if it should prove ineffec-
tual for the purpose intended, a second should be executed in its
place. The consideration of the first was held sufficient to sup-
port a second made in pursuance of such provision.3 0
Even the giving of additional time for the payment of an
exisiting debt, by a valid agreement, for any period, however
short, though it be for a day only, is held to be sufficient to sup-
port a mortgage or a conveyance, as a purchase for a valuable
consideration. 3 '
24Bucklin v. Bueklin, 1 Abb. App. Cas. 247.
R51?oy v. Hollenbecki, 42 Fed. 381.
26,Tones v. Jones, (1906) 20 S. D. 632, 108 N. W. 23.2TBabcoclk v. Wyman, (1856) 19 How. 289, 15 L. Ed. 644.
In Forester v. Van Auken, (1903) 12 N. D. 175, 96 N. W. 301,
grantee was mother-in-law of grantor; and, in Mooey v. Morris, (1900)
57 S. W. 442, grantee was brother-in-law of grantor, yet the relation-
ship was not referred to as a means of characterizing the transaction.
'*Zirlcpatriclk v. Taylor, 43 Ill. 208; Forbes v. Williams, 15 Iii. App.
305.
'*'Hincks v. Field et al, 14 N. Y. Supp. 247, 37 N. Y. St. Rep. 724,
af'd 129 N. Y. 633.
1ary v. White, 52 N. Y. 138; Gilchrist v. Gough, 63 Ind. 5716;
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Liability to loss on the part of the mortgagee is consid-
eration for a mortgage given to secure him against it, as much as
a direct benefit to the mortgagor, of whatever nature it may
be. 32 The consideration is valid in such case even though the
mortgage is given after the surety has incurred the obligation.
33
While the courts are rather consistent in holding that a
valuable consideration is necessary to support a mortgage, it is
not generally necessary that the consideration be adequate.3 4
Blackstone defines a valuable consideration with reference to a
conveyance as:
"money, marriage or the like, which the law esteems an equivalent
given for the grant." "
The adequacy of the consideration becomes most apparent, not
when determining the validity of a mortgage at its inception,
but when the court endeavors to determine the intent of the
parties, i. e., whether a mortgage or a conditional sale was
intended.
III
A MORTGAGE AS A GIFT
While several cases are sometimes stated by text writers to
support the proposition that a mortgage can be validly ex-
ecuted as a g-ift, it is to be questioned whether the conclusion is
sound. As pointed out before, one might well conclude that no
mere should be necessary to uphold a conveyance on a condition
(a mortgage) than an absolute conveyance, but the courts are
prone to consider that a mortgage is only a secondary obliga-
tion to secure a primary obligation, a debt, and that a pre-
requisite to the validity of the same is a valuable consideration.
In one of the type cases, a husband gave a bond and mort-
gage to his wife. He was not indebted to her at the time in any
sum whatever. The court held that the bonds were a promise
on the part of the husband to pay at some future day the sums
mentioned in them, and being vithout con .eratlon, the promise
,clzumpert v. DiYard, 55 MIss. 348; Port v. Embree, 54 Iowa 14, 6 N. W.
83.
Hataden v. Buddensick, 4 Hun. 649, 49 How. Pr. 241.
"Wiliams v. Silteman, 74 Tex. 601, 12 S. W. 534.
Lawrence v. McUamont, 2 How. 426.
" 2 B1. Comm. 296.
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could not be enforced against the donor, or against his estate, a
meritorious consideration not being sufficient to sustain such a
promise.3 6
IV
Tnn STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
Still another question of no inconsiderable significance is a
determination of the character of the obligation which supports
the mortgage when the original consideration runs afoul the
statute of limitations. The most likely situations apparent at
once are those in which an action on the debt is barred because
of the operation of the Statute of Limitations, or a situation in
which the debtor has been discharged of his obligations by a
proceeding in bankruptcy.
Consistent with the principle that the debt is the principal
thing and the mortgage is only security therefor, the courts
generally hold that the statute of limitations does not discharge
the debt or extinguish the right but only takes away the remedy.
The reason for the rule, in general, is that the mortgage and the
debt give rise to distinct causes of action, and distinct remedies
may be pursued as to them.3 7
Even though the debt may be barred by the statute of lim-
itations, the lien may be enforced. 8  The theory in the United
States is that the general effect of the Statute is merely to take
away the remedy and not to extinguish the debt.3 9 In regard
to this conception, Justice Hogeboom says in Pratt v. Huggins :40
"It is said that the note from the lapse of time Is presumed to be
paid. Not altogether so; for the law allows a suit on it, and a recovery
unless the Statute of Limitations is pleaded. It is, therefore, at most
but a presumption; suffered- to be overthrown, it is true, only in one
way, and that Is by proof of payment thereon, or recognition thereof,
in the way pointed out in the statute. This, however, as before stated,
only acts on the remedy."
Although the mortgagee may foreclose his mortgage after the
debt is barred, he cannot foreclose it after the statutory period
-in re James, 40 N. . 876.
3 Tichel v. CariZo, 42 Cal. 493; Low v. ANen, 26 Cal. 141.
3Ke7ar v. Hinton, 14 B. Mon. (Ky.) 307; McElmoylwe v. Cohen,
13 Pet. 19.
gralterinire v. Westover, 14 N. Y. 16.
429 Barb. 277.
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has run against the mortgage as a specialty.4 1 Only in a limited
number of jurisdictions is a mortgage so considered.
42
Ordinarily, the statute of limitations as to the debt does
not in any way apply to the mortgage security. This remains
in force until the debt is paid. Payment can be established by
direct evidence and also 'by the statutory presumption that pay-
ment has been made within twenty years after the cause of
action arose.
43
If the debt is secured by a lien or other security, the fact
that the original debt is barred does not necessarily operate as
a bar against the lien or security,44 although this rule has been
applied in jurisdictions in which it is said that the debt is ex-
tinguished by the operation of the statute of limitations. 45 This
rule applies in cases in which the debt barred by the statute is
secured by a mortgage on realty,46 or by a chattel mortgage.47
That the statute of limitations does not completely extin-
guish the remedy is evidenced by the fact that the courts will
sometimes permit the mortgagee to sell the mortgaged property
after the statute of limitations has run against foreclosure,
where a power of sale is contained in the mortgage. 48 The con-
sideration to support the validity of the mortgage in such a
case is apparently the original obligation. If the period which
is fixed by the statute has run, the original obligation may serve
as a consideration for a new promise.4 9
Thus, so far as the question of consideration is concerned,
the creditor may proceed to foreclose his mortgage notwith-
standing the bar of the debt by the statute of limitations. The
cases are uniform in this respect.5 0 The reasoning back of this
rule is explained in Busk v. Cooper wherein the court explains
that it was:
"The Intention of the legislature to carry out the distinction be-
Kerr v. Lydecker, 51 Ohio St. 240, 37 N. E. 267.
4Bailey v. guth, 14 Ohio St. 396.
"Longstreet v. Brown (N. J. Eq.) 37 Atl. 56.
"Holmquist v. Gilbert, 41 Colo. 113, 92 Pac. 232.
"Bishop v. Douglas, 25 Wise. 696; Cerney v. Pawlot, 66 Wise. 262,
28 N. W. 183.
ImHolmquist v. Gflbert, supra.
"Lembeck & Betz Eagle Brewing Go. v. Krause, 109 Atl. 293.
OMenzel v. Hinton, 132 N. C. 660, 44 S. E. 385.
'See. 320, p. 1670-1678, Page on Contracts.
"Miffer v. Helm, 2 S. & M. 697; Bank Metropolis v. Guttschlick,
14 Peters 19; Thayer v. Mann, 19 Pick. 535.
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tween the personal liability of the debtor and the liability of the land,
and to preserve the latter in full force, unaffected by the discharge
of the debtor."'"
Practically the same result is obtained where the debtor
has been discharged of his obligations by bankruptcy proceed-
ings. The act of Congress of 1841 specifically provides that:
"Nothing in the act shall be construed to annul, destroy or impair-
. . any liens, mortgages, or other securities on property, real
or personal."'
From this it is manifest that:
"While the privilege was granted to the debtor to be personally
discharged from the debt, any security which the creditor might have,
consisting of a lien on property was left in as full force as though the
debtor had never been discharged from the debt, for the security of
which the lien was made. 5'
V
CONSIDERATION IN "LIEN" ANl "TITLE" JURISDICTIONS
One pertinent question remains. Is the doctrine of consid-
eration in mortgages affected by the determination of whether
it is executed in a "lien" or "title" jurisdiction? In England
and in many of our states the law courts still hold to the old
legal theory and regard the title and right of possession as pass-
ing to the mortgagee, though the strict legal doctrine has become
much modified. But even in the law courts of the "title" theory
states, the mortgagor today is regarded as the real owner as to
everyone except the owner of the mortgage.5 4 In the majority
of the states the law courts have adopted the equitable theory of
mortgages, and in these states the title remains in the mortgagor,
who is the owner of the property, and the mortgagee has only a
lien on it. 5 ;
- 15 L. Ed. 273, 274.
Sec. 2, Act of Congress, 1841.
5 'Bush v. Cooper, 26 Miss. 509, 510.
" The states in which this view prevails are Alabama, Arkansas,
Connecticut, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee,
Vermont, Virginia, and West Virginia.
5The states in which this view prevails are California, Colorado,
Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New York, North
Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Wis-
consin, Utah, and Washington. In Delaware, Mississippi and Missouri,
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The doctrine of consideration is technically applicable to
executory contracts only. Even the courts of equity consider a
mortgage as an executed rather than an executory contract. A
mortgage conveys a legal interest to land although the mortgagee
cannot obtain possession before foreclosure, even in case of
default. Still, the mortgagee gets an interest in the mortgaged
land, and the extent of his interest'is measured by the obligation
it purports to secure. Thus, so far as the mortgage conveys a
legal interest, there is no more or no less necessity for consid-
eration than when full legal title subject to a condition sub-
sequent is conveyed. 56 In either case, it is necessary that there
be a debtor-creditor relation between the mortgagor and the
mortgagee, which pre-supposes the existence of a debt or an
obligation of legal import.
The chief difference in the application of the two theories,
the "lien" or the "title" theory, arises not in the substantive
question of consideration to support the contract, which is the
same in both instances, but in the character of the rights which
the parties acquire under the mortgage.
CLAnlcE E. BARNms,
Oklahoma State College,
Stillwater, Oklahoma.
there is a combination of the two theories. Before default the mort-
gagee has only a lien, after default he has legal title.
N Morrls Karon, 2 Wise. L. R. 59, 60.

